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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Before us are two consolidated appeals. In the first, 
Stich, Angell, Kreidler, Brownson and Ballou, P.A. ("Stich, 
Angell"), Frederick Whitaker ("Whitaker") and Weitz & 
Luxenberg, P.C. ("Weitz & Luxenberg") appeal the District 
Court's January 21, 1998 order, which declared a 
distribution of funds held by the Stich, Angellfirm in 
escrow for the United States Fire Insurance Company ("U.S. 
Fire") and The North River Insurance Company ("North 
River") (collectively, the "Insurers") to be in violation of an 
earlier injunction. We dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
In the second appeal, the Insurers challenge the District 
Court's August 28, 1998 Order dismissing their statutory 
interpleader action for laches and for lack of jurisdiction. 
The Insurers also contest the District Court's ruling that 
the Insurers waived certain attorney-based privileges. We 
hold that the District Court possessed jurisdiction over the 
interpleader action, and therefore reverse the District 
Court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. With respect to 
the laches defense, we hold that the District Court erred in 
calculating the length of the Insurers' delay infiling the 
interpleader action and that the Court improperly failed to 
provide the Insurers with an opportunity to present 
evidence regarding the reasons for the delay. We therefore 
vacate the District Court's dismissal based on laches and 
remand for further proceedings. Finally, we conclude that 
the Insurers did not waive their attorney-based privileges 







U.S. Fire and North River are excess insurers of 
Asbestospray Corporation and related entities (collectively, 
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"Asbestospray"), all of which now are bankrupt. 
Asbestospray is a defendant in over 27,000 personal injury 
suits pending in courts throughout the country. In addition 
to the contingent liabilities posed by these 27,000 suits, the 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("Baltimore") have 
obtained an $8.33 million judgment against Asbestospray 
for reimbursement of costs incurred in removing asbestos 
from public buildings in the City of Baltimore. 
Asbestospray's sole remaining asset is the proceeds of the 
insurance policies at issue here. 
 
These insurance policies provided excess coverage of $5 
million per year from 1971 to 1976 for a total of $25 million 
in coverage. Because the policies are excess policies, the 
coverage under them is triggered only if and when the 
primary layer of coverage is exhausted. The primary layer of 
coverage was exhausted in May 1995, at which point the 
Insurers became obligated to defend Asbestospray in 
asbestos-related lawsuits. The policies expressly provide 
that defense litigation costs, including counsel fees, apply 
against the policy limits. 
 
Between May 1995 and June 13, 1997, the Insurers 
disbursed over $21 million of the $25 million of the 
aggregate coverage. The sum of $6.5 million was paid to 
settle personal injury claims, while the sum of $9.2 million 
was paid in legal defense costs. Settlements in principle, 
agreed to but not paid as of June 13, 1997, totaled $5.39 
million. The Insurers deposited this $5.39 million sum in 
an escrow account administered by Asbestospray's national 
coordinating defense counsel, Robert Brownson, Esq. 
("Brownson"), and his law firm, Stich, Angell. Deducting 
from the aggregate coverage of $25 million the sums 
expended for settlements in fact and in principle, as well as 
accumulated defense costs, $3.88 million in unexhausted 
coverage remained as of June 13, 1997 to satisfy both the 





In 1984, Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court 
against Asbestospray (and more than 40 other asbestos 
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manufacturers), seeking to recover costs incurred in 
removing asbestos from City-owned buildings. In 1992, a 
jury returned a verdict in Baltimore's favor, and ultimately 
the Maryland Court entered judgment against Asbestospray 
for $8.33 million in compensatory damages. This award 
was upheld on direct appeal, and in 1993, Baltimore served 
writs of garnishment against the Insurers seeking recovery 
against the policies at issue here. The writs directed the 
Insurers as garnishees to "hold the property of .. . 
[Asbestospray] subject to further proceedings in this Court." 
The Insurers answered the writs and, among other things, 
denied coverage for asbestos remediation claims of the type 
upon which Baltimore's judgment was based. 
 
In 1994, the Insurers moved the Maryland Court for 
summary judgment on the ground that the policies do not 
provide coverage for asbestos remediation claims. Instead of 
ruling on the coverage issue, the Maryland Court entered a 
default judgment against the Insurers as a sanction for 
alleged discovery violations. The Insurers appealed, and in 
August 1996, the Maryland Court of Appeals vacated the 
default judgment and remanded the case to the trial court. 
North River Ins. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 
343 Md. 34, 680 A.2d 480 (Md. 1996). The Maryland Court 
subsequently denied the Insurers' motion for summary 
judgment with respect to coverage. 
 
From August 1996 to June 1997, the date this 
interpleader action was filed, the Maryland garnishment 
action was not actively litigated. In September 1998, 
Baltimore moved the Maryland Court to enjoin plaintiffs 
from paying their settlements in principle from the escrow 
account. Pursuant to this motion, the Maryland Court has 
ordered the Insurers not to pay any further proceeds from 
the escrow fund to any Asbestospray claimant pending 




The Insurers commenced this statutory interpleader on 
June 13, 1997, and in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 
S 1335(a)(2) (1994), they filed an interpleader bond of $3.88 
million, an amount which represented the proceeds of the 
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policies that either had not been paid out or that had not 
been committed by way of settlements in principle. On 
June 13, 1997, the District Court entered an order 
(hereafter, the "June 13 Order") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2361 (1994): 
 
       restraining for a period of 20 days from the date hereof 
       (or until further order of this Court) all claimants from 
       instituting an action or further prosecuting any 
       existing action in any state court or in any Court of the 
       United States or in any other tribunal against the 
       United States Fire Insurance Company and North River 
       Insurance Company (the "Plaintiffs") seeking recovery 
       under policies issued by Plaintiffs to [Asbestospray]. 
 
By order dated August 1, 1997, the District Court 
continued the injunction indefinitely. 
 
On July 25, 1997, Baltimore filed an answer and 
opposition to the interpleader on the grounds that: (1) the 
amount of the interpleader bond was insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction; (2) the action was equitably barred by laches; 
(3) the action was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands; 
and (4) the interpleader was brought to avoid litigation of 
the garnishment action in the Maryland Court. The District 
Court scheduled a hearing for July 30, 1997, at which the 
District Court heard argument on whether it had 
jurisdiction and whether the action was barred by laches. 
The District Court did not rule on any of these matters but 




On July 18, 1997, Weitz & Luxenberg filed a motion in 
New York State court on behalf of one of its clients, 
Frederick Whitaker ("Whitaker"), seeking to compel 
payment of a $2 million settlement from the escrow fund. 
On July 24, the New York Court ordered the funds to be 
disbursed no later than July 31, 1997. Browning, acting as 
escrow agent, declined to pay the amount despite the New 
York Court order because (1) the Insurers instructed him 
not to and (2) the June 13 Order arguably enjoined 
disbursement from the escrow account. 
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On August 6, Weitz & Luxenberg moved the New York 
Court to hold Browning in contempt if the settlement 
proceeds were not paid by September 4, 1997. Browning 
wrote a letter to the Insurers informing them of the 
contempt motion and advising them that he planned to wire 
the funds to Weitz & Luxenberg on September 3 unless the 
Insurers obtained an order from the District Court directing 
him not to do so. The Insurers did not obtain an Order by 
the deadline set forth in the letter, and on September 3, 
Browning wired $2 million from the escrow account to a 
bank account held by Weitz & Luxenberg. 
 
Later that same day, upon learning of the $2 million wire 
transfer, the Insurers terminated the Stich, Angell firm as 
escrow agent. The Insurers currently maintain control over 
the remaining funds (the $5.39 million formerly held in the 
escrow account, less the $2 million that was disbursed to 
settle the Whitaker suit) and have posted an additional 
interpleader bond of $3.39 million. 
 
On September 8, the Insurers filed a motion seeking 
clarification of the original restraining order. The District 
Court ruled on the motion by order dated January 21, 1998 
(hereafter, the "January 21 Order"). The District Court: 
 
       MODIFIED [the June 13 Order] to include within the 
       definition of "policies issued by the Plaintiffs to the 
       Insurers" any funds held in escrow or otherwise by 
       third parties, including funds in the escrow account 
       previously held by Stich, Angell, Kreidler, Brownson & 
       Ballou, P.C. as escrow holders. 
 
The District Court then: 
 
       DECLARE[D] that the transfer of the above-referenced 
       funds to the law firm of Weitz & Luxenberg to settle the 
       action styled Whitaker v. Asbestospray, et al., Supreme 
       Court of New York, County of New York, Index No. 96- 
       116205 constituted a violation of this court's order[sic] 
       of June 13, 1997 and August 1, 1997. 
 
The District Court did not impose sanctions or otherwise 
penalize the asserted violation of the June 13 Order. 
 




The January 21 Order also addressed several 
outstanding discovery matters. Prior to the issuance of the 
January 21 Order, Baltimore and other defendants 
requested discovery relating to the timing of thefiling of the 
interpleader action. The Insurers objected to some of the 
requests on the ground that they sought materials 
protected by attorney-client and work product privileges. 
 
The District Court rejected the Insurers' assertion of 
privilege in its January 21 Order. The District Court ruled 
that the Insurers waived their attorney-based privileges by 
their assertedly untimely filing of the interpleader action: 
 
       [W]e find the plaintiffs by bringing this action waived 
       any attorney client privilege concerning why the action 
       was brought, its timing, the existence of any 
       garnishments against the fund, plaintiffs' own 
       calculations of projected liabilities of the fund, as well 




After the District Court denied motions for 
reconsideration of its January 21 Order, the parties 
continued with discovery. On April 9, 1998, Baltimore 
moved to dismiss the interpleader action. The sole ground 
raised in Baltimore's moving papers was its contention that 
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because the interpleader bond was insufficient to cover the 
amount of policy proceeds in controversy. On August 28, 
the District Court dismissed the case based on (1) laches 
and (2) the asserted insufficiency of the interpleader bond. 
 
The Insurers appeal the August 28 Order, as well as the 
District Court's rulings on their attorney-based privileges in 
its January 21 Order. Brownson, Stich, Angell, Whitaker 
and Weitz & Luxenberg appeal the District Court's 
determination in its January 21 Order that the transfer 
from the escrow fund violated the District Court's June 13 
Order. 
 






We first address whether we have jurisdiction over Stich, 
Angell's1 appeal of the January 21 Order. We conclude that 
we do not, and we therefore dismiss that appeal. 
 
Stich, Angell appeals the January 21 Order which 
purports to: (1) modify the June 13 Order and (2) declare 
the $2 million distribution in violation of the June 13 
Order. Stich, Angell first argues that we have jurisdiction to 
hear its appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) (1994), 
which provides for appellate jurisdiction over 
"[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, 
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or 
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a 
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
 
We do not have jurisdiction over Stich, Angell's appeal 
under S 1292(a)(1). We recognize that the January 21 Order 
purports to modify the June 13 Order, which by virtue of 
its duration was converted into a preliminary injunction, 
SEC v. Black, 163 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1998), and that 
therefore it is plausible to assert jurisdiction under 
S 1292(a)(1). We reject S 1292(a)(1) as a jurisdictional basis, 
however, because the January 21 Order, despite some of its 
language, does not in fact modify the June 13 Order. 
 
It is well settled that when determining our jurisdiction, 
we must examine the substance of the order rather than 
merely its language. Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm , 500 F.2d 
601, 604 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc); Gregory v. Depte, 896 
F.2d 31, 38 n.14 (3d Cir. 1990) (Becker, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is important to note that 
the labels attached by the district court to its order are not 
determinative"). Here, we conclude that the January 21 
Order did not in fact modify the June 13 Order but instead 
clarified that, in the District Court's view, the June 13 
Order applied to the funds held in escrow by Stich, Angell 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We refer to the Appellants Stich, Angell, Brownson, Whitaker and 
Weitz & Luxenberg collectively as Stich, Angell unless the context 
requires otherwise. 
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and thus prohibited their transfer to Weitz & Luxenberg. If 
the January 21 Order is not interpreted in this way as a 
clarification of the June 13 Order but is instead construed 
as a modification of that order (broadening it so as to make 
it applicable for the first time to the funds held in escrow), 
the District Court plainly would have had no basis for 
declaring that the prior transfer of funds to Weitz & 
Luxenberg was in violation of the earlier order. We 
recognize that the District Court did use the term 
"MODIFIED" in the June 13 Order, but we attribute this to 
a mistake in draftsmanship. It does not persuade us that 
the June 13 Order was in substance a modification rather 
than a clarification or interpretation, and our appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) does not extend to 
orders, such as the January 21 Order, that interpret or 
clarify injunctions. Motorola, Inc. v. Computer Displays Int'l, 
Inc., 739 F.2d 1149, 1155 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 
Stich, Angell next argues that we have jurisdiction under 
the "collateral order" doctrine. This doctrine is a narrow 
exception to the final judgment rule under which a"small 
class" of collateral orders are deemed final even though 
they do not terminate the underlying litigation. Christy v. 
Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 203-204 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Cohen 
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). We have 
jurisdiction to review a collateral order only when the order: 
(1) finally resolves a disputed question; (2) raises an 
important jurisprudential issue distinct from the merits of 
the case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from 
a final judgment. Christy, 115 F.3d at 203-204. Here, we 
see no reason why the January 21 Order would be 
unreviewable on appeal from an order fully disposing of the 
case. Nor do we agree with Stich, Angell's assertion that the 
issues raised by its appeal, which chiefly concern the 
interpretation of an order clarifying a preliminary 
injunction, are so important jurisprudentially that we 
should disregard the normal rule of finality. Compare 
Christy, 115 F.3d at 205 (appeal of order holding habeas 
corpus petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of 
constitutional claims in state court raised important 
jurisprudential issues in light of conflicting case law and 
"important nature of capital habeas cases in general"). The 
parties raise no other bases for appellate jurisdiction, and 
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we discern no other basis ourselves. Accordingly, we 






Next, we address the District Court's dismissal of the 
interpleader action based on laches. Because we conclude 
that the record was not sufficiently developed with respect 
to the possible justifications for the Insurers' delay in filing 
the interpleader, and further because we conclude that the 
District Court erred in calculating the period of delay, we 
vacate the District Court's order dismissing the interpleader 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
"Both the length of delay and the existence of prejudice 
are questions of fact to be reviewed by this court under the 
`clearly erroneous' standard." Churma v. United States Steel 
Corp., 514 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1975); see also EEOC v. 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 84 (3d Cir. 
1984). Whether delay is "inexcusable" on the facts 
presented is a conclusion of law over which our review is 
plenary. Great Atlantic, 735 F.2d at 81. If we agree with the 
district court's legal conclusion that a given historical delay 
is inexcusable, we review the court's assessment of the 
equities for abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Churma, 514 
F.2d at 593 
 
Because interpleader is an equitable proceeding, it is 
subject to dismissal based on equitable doctrines such as 
laches. In re Bohart, 743 F.2d 313, 325 (5th Cir. 1984). In 
this regard, it has ". . . been often stated-- although rarely 
held -- that interpleader is properly denied when the 
stakeholder is . . . guilty of laches." Id.  at 326 n.11 (quoting 
3A Moore's Federal Practice P 22.16[1] (1984)); see also 7 
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 
2d S 1709 (West 1986) ("[C]ourts are reluctant to refuse 
interpleader [for laches] since the inconvenience to the 
stakeholder and the courts that would result if multiple 
litigation, and possibly multiple liability, came to pass are 
at least as troublesome as rewarding the stakeholder's 
questionable conduct."). 
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The party asserting laches as a defensive bar must 
establish (1) an inexcusable delay in bringing the action 
and (2) prejudice. Great Atlantic, 735 F.2d at 81; Churma, 
514 F.2d at 593. To establish prejudice, the party raising 
laches must demonstrate that the delay caused a 
disadvantage in asserting and establishing a claimed right 
or defense; the mere loss of what one would have otherwise 
kept does not establish prejudice. In re Bohart, 743 F.2d at 
327 (reversing district court's dismissal of interpleader 
based on laches). 
 
Here, the District Court held as a matter of law that the 
Insurers' delay in filing the interpleader action was 
unreasonable and prejudicial to potential claimants, and 
the Court accordingly dismissed the interpleader action 
with prejudice. Although laches was raised as an 
affirmative defense in Baltimore's answer to the 
interpleader, the only issue raised by Baltimore in its 
motion to dismiss -- and therefore the only matter as to 
which the Insurers were on proper notice to defend-- 
pertained to the asserted insufficiency of the interpleader 
bond. Moreover, because the motion to dismiss was 
couched solely in terms of the jurisdictional insufficiency of 
the interpleader bond, the Insurers were not provided an 
opportunity to present reasons for the delay infiling or to 
conduct discovery into the prejudice that Baltimore alleged 
it suffered. 
 
Against this procedural canvas, the District Court held 
that "as a matter of law . . . the [Insurers] knew or should 
have known that the available insurance pool was 
insufficient as early as February 22, 1993," and that 
therefore they had "a duty to file the interpleader, if they 
were to do it at all," at that time. The Insurers' coverage 
under their excess policies, however, was not triggered until 
May 1995, when the primary layer of coverage was 
exhausted. The District Court erred in charging the 
Insurers with inexcusable delay during the period from 
February 1993 to May 1995, a time when the Insurers' 
duty to defend and indemnify had not been activated as a 
matter of law. 
 
Furthermore, because the District Court ruled on an 
inadequate record, it did not have an opportunity to weigh 
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the Insurers' explanation for at least a portion of the delay 
after May 1995. When the policies were triggered in 1995, 
they were subject to Baltimore's valid default judgment 
against them entered by the Maryland Court as a discovery 
sanction. The Insurers claim that filing an interpleader 
when there existed a valid judgment against the policies 
would have subjected the claim to dismissal and charges of 
forum shopping. See, e.g., B.J. Van Ingen & Co. v. Connolly, 
225 F.2d 740, 741 (3d Cir. 1955) (affirming dismissal of 
interpleader: "[T]his interpleader is an attempt to obtain in 
a federal forum a separate adjudication of a controversy 
which has arisen in the attempted enforcement of a decree 
of a state court"). On remand, the District Court should 
assess the credibility of the Insurers' explanation in 
determining whether the delay was inexcusable.2 
 
The District Court also found that Baltimore and the 
other potential claimants against the res were prejudiced 
because the insurance proceeds were "dissipated" by the 
Insurers' practice of settling claims before the interpleader 
was filed, thereby leaving an insufficient fund to pay the 
remaining claims. But see In re Bohart, 743 F.2d 313 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (rejecting similar claim of prejudice and reversing 
district court's dismissal of statutory interpleader based on 
laches). As we mention above, the District Court did not 
receive briefing from the parties or permit discovery on the 
issue of prejudice. Accordingly, we vacate the District 
Court's finding of prejudice and remand so that a more 
complete record on this issue may be developed.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that, should the District Court credit the Insurers' 
explanation, the seven-month period from the time of vacatur to the 
commencement of the interpleader does not appear on its face to 
constitute an unreasonable delay. Cf. Great Atlantic, 735 F.2d at 78-85 
(reversing district court's finding of inordinate delay despite three 
multi- 
year long gaps in proceedings). 
 
3. Baltimore also urges us to affirm the District Court based on the 
doctrine of unclean hands. We agree with the Insurers that the District 
Court's dismissal was not based on unclean hands and that the 
reference to the doctrine in the District Court's opinion was intended 
instead to provide an example of the type of equitable considerations 
that may, in general, justify the dismissal of an interpleader action. 
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2. The Amount of the Interpleader Bond 
 
The District Court rested its dismissal on the alternative 
basis that the interpleader bond was insufficient because it 
did not cover the entire proceeds of the insurance policies 
-- $25 million -- or even the funds deposited in the escrow 
account. However, because the original interpleader bond of 
$3.88 million deposited with the District Court represents 
the amount of proceeds reasonably in controversy, we 
conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing the 
interpleader based on the alleged insufficiency of the bond. 
 
A proper deposit or bond is a jurisdictional prerequisite 
to bringing an interpleader. 28 U.S.C. S 1335(a)(2) (1994); In 
re Sinking of M/V Ukola, 806 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986); 7 
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
2d S 1716 (West 1986). The stakeholder invoking 
interpleader must deposit the largest amount for which it 
may be liable in view of the subject matter of the 
controversy. 28 U.S.C. S 1335(a)(2) (1994); CNA Ins. Cos. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the event that the unclean hands theory is pressed on remand, we 
note that the record as it presently stands contains insufficient evidence 
to establish unclean hands. To the extent the District Court found 
inequitable conduct that might be equated with "unclean hands," its 
finding was based on the assertedly improper delay and the allegedly 
improper decision to "dissipate" the insurance policy proceeds prior to 
filing the interpleader. We have vacated the District Court's finding of 
unreasonable delay, and note that even if the District Court finds on 
remand that the Insurers unreasonably delayed for purposes of 
determining whether laches should bar the action, it does not 
necessarily follow that the Insurers were guilty of unclean hands by 
acting fraudulently, unconscionably or in bad faith. See S&R Corp. v. 
Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 377 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992). Furthermore, 
the "dissipation" identified by the District Court, even if proven true, 
would not, without a further finding of fraud, unconscionability, or bad 
faith, constitute unclean hands. See Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. 
v. Ramy Seed Co., 271 F.2d 24, 28 (8th Cir. 1959) (plaintiff had "clean 
hands" even though the property he tendered to the court was 
insufficient to satisfy all the demands of the interpleaded claimants). 
 
                                15 
  
Waters, 926 F.2d 247, 249-50 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991); M/V 
Ukola, 806 F.2d at 5.4 
 
Here, the Appellees claim entitlement to the entire $25 
million in insurance proceeds, and they therefore argue 
that this amount should be deposited with the Court. The 
determination of the appropriate deposit, however, is not a 
mechanical process under which the court uncritically 
searches for the highest amount claimed by the adverse 
claimants and requires that amount to be deposited; rather, 
the determination "depends upon the person who invokes 
the interpleader and what he asserts to be the subject 
matter of the controversy." M/V Ukola, 806 F.2d at 5. 
Amounts that are not realistically within the scope of the 
interpleader as pleaded are not required to be deposited or 
bonded to sustain federal jurisdiction. Id.; 7 Wright, Miller 
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d S 1716 
(West 1986) ("[T]he court will have to inquire into the 
underlying merits of a claim to determine proper amount of 
the deposit or bond."). 
 
In this case, the sum put into controversy by the 
interpleader complaint was $3.88 million -- the 
unexhausted proceeds of the policy. See Aetna Cas. & 
Surety Co. v. Ahrens, 414 F. Supp. 1235, 1254 (S.D. Tex. 
1975) (where an interpleader involves liability insurance 
proceeds, the money or property in dispute is the 
unexhausted policy limits and plaintiff need only deposit 
unexhausted policy limits at the time of interpleader). In 
the absence of a claim of collusion or fraud on the part of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Even if the District Court were correct that the interpleader bond of 
$3.88 million was insufficient, it erred in dismissing the complaint 
without affording an opportunity to cure. "The law is clear . . . that 
[the 
stakeholder] [is] permitted to cure this defect by making an additional 
deposit with the court registry." Waters, 926 F.2d at 250 n.6. 
 
Indeed, the Insurers have bonded the sum that remains in the former 
Stich, Angell escrow and placed it under the District Court's 
jurisdiction. 
Although, as we explain below, we conclude that the Insurers need not 
have deposited sums already committed to settlements in principle to 
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the interpleader statute, that 
they have done so points to the error of the District Court's dismissal 
without affording the Insurers the opportunity to cure. 
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the Insurers in settling claims prior to the commencement 
of the interpleader -- and no such claim is before us -- 
there is no merit to the Appellees' claims to sums beyond 
the $3.88 million that remains in unexhausted policy  
proceeds.5 The sums that have been paid out or 
contractually committed to settle ongoing, pre-interpleader 
lawsuits from other state courts were not realistically part 
of the interpleader action as it was pleaded, and therefore 
these sums were not required to be deposited with the 
court to sustain federal jurisdiction. 
 
We note as well that the District Court's expansive view 
of its interpleader jurisdiction is inconsistent with the 
limited nature of the interpleader device. An injunction 
issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2361 "must not be 
overbroad." 7 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d S 1717 (West 1986). The injunction 
cannot extend to litigation involving the fund that is not 
within the subject matter of the interpleader. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) 
("[I]nterpleader was never intended . . . to be an all-purpose 
`bill of peace.' "); Commercial Sec. Bank v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (10th Cir. 1972) 
(injunction exceeded permissible scope when it purported to 
enjoin litigation beyond the res); Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil 
Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966) (injunction barring 
litigation involving title to oil-producing land void for lack of 
jurisdiction where the interpleaded fund consisted solely of 
disputed revenues produced by sale of oil taken from the 
land: "This was an in personam exercise of jurisdiction. In 
an interpleader action, however, in personam jurisdiction 
extends only to the fund deposited with the court"), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Our mandate does not prevent Baltimore or the other Appellees from 
seeking in other fora to recover from the Insurers personally based on 
other legal theories, such as the theory that they violated the Maryland 
Court's writ of garnishment. Our statement regarding the viability of the 
Appellees' claims to sums beyond the unexhausted policy proceeds is 
limited to the context of this interpleader action alone. Cf. Douglas- 
Guardian, 271 F.2d at 28 ("In the event that any of the defendants have 
claims against the plaintiff, as distinguished from claims to this 
property, such claims can be asserted; however, plaintiff should not be 
required to give a bond to cover such claims."). 
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overruled on other grounds by Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Acme Tool Div., 540 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 1976); 
see Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. R.L. Burns 
Corp., 552 F. Supp. 113, 114 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Subject 
matter jurisdiction under S 1335 is limited to the resolution 
of conflicting claims to the fund in controversy."). 
 
Because the injunction available under S 2361 is an 
exception to the generally applicable rule barring federal 
injunctions of state court proceedings, 28 U.S.C. S 2283 
(1994), federal courts should defer to parallel state 
proceedings that pre-date the interpleader, especially 
where, as here, the proceedings have resulted in judgments 
(or settlements in principle). See NY Life Distribs., Inc. v. 
Adherence Group, Inc., 72 F.3d 371, 381 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(district court retains equitable discretion to determine 
whether "the issues raised in an interpleader action may be 
better resolved in a state court"); see also  7 Wright, Miller 
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d S 1717 
(West 1986). The friction between the New York State Court 
and the District Court in this case points out the 
undesirable consequences of an interpleader injunction 
that is overly broad and unduly interferes with parallel 
state-court proceedings. 
 
The District Court erred when it concluded that the pre- 
interpleader settlements were part of the res properly 
subject to its interpleader jurisdiction, and therefore erred 
in dismissing the interpleader based on the alleged 
insufficiency of the interpleader bond. Accordingly, we 
vacate the District Court's order dismissing the interpleader 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
3. The District Court's Privilege Rulings 
 
Finally, the Insurers object to the District Court's ruling, 
in its January 21 Order, that the Insurers waived the 
attorney-client and attorney work product privileges by 
allegedly placing privileged material directly at issue in this 
suit. We agree with the Insurers that the District Court 
erred in so ruling. 
 
A party may waive attorney-based privileges by asserting 
"claims or defenses that put his or her attorney's advice in 
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issue in the litigation." Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home 
Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994). A party waives 
the privilege only when he or she "has made the decision 
and taken the affirmative step in the litigation to place the 
advice of the attorney in issue." Id. (citing as an example of 
waiver a defendant who asserts reliance on advice of 
counsel as a defense); see also Livingstone v. North Belle 
Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 537 (3d Cir. 1996) (assertion 
of defense directly implicating advice of counsel waives 
attorney-client privilege as to that issue), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1142 (1997). 
 
In this case, the Insurers did not assert any claim or take 
any affirmative step that placed the advice of counsel at 
issue. Rather, they argued based on the record and in 
defense of a laches claim that the delay in filing the 
interpleader was objectively justified. Neither the fact that 
the Insurers raised this argument nor the timing of the 
interpleader action can be interpreted as an affirmative 
waiver of the attorney-based privileges. We reverse the 




For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Stich, Angell's 
appeal of the January 21 Order for lack of jurisdiction, 
vacate the August 28 Order dismissing the interpleader for 
laches and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reverse the 
January 21 Order insofar as it declared that the Insurers 
waived the attorney-client and work product privileges, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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